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OVERVIEW
This report summarises key themes of corruption and wildlife 
crime as drawn from the literature reviews and interviews, and 
salient points arising from a discussion group in April 2018.  
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ILLEGAL PAYMENTS/EXTORTION 
RELATED TO POACHING
2
BRIBERY/COLLUSION TO AVOID 
PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL ACTS
3
BRIBERY/COLLUSION TO LAUNDER 
LEGAL/ILLEGAL CAVIAR FOR SALE 
4
BRIBERY/COLLUSION TO SMUGGLE 
ILLEGAL CAVIAR TO EXPORT MARKETS
5
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN 
COMPANIES AND ENFORCEMENT
WILD CAVIAR
CONSUMER 
PREFERENCE FOR
IS A KEY DRIVER OF ILLEGALITY
The report includes an original overview 
of the basic typology of corrupt practices 
identified in the illegal caviar trade, and 
disaggregates these by site, location in 
the trade chain, typical actors involved, 
type of corruption, and the types of 
relationships involved.
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ALL 
27 species
of sturgeon are listed on the IUCN Red List™
OF WHICH 
16 species
are listed as Critically Endangered
FOLLOWING 
21 years
of CITES* regulation, illegal trade continues to 
threaten the survival of stugeon in the wild
THE SIX KEY
markets
of consumption and trade (based on legal 
trade reported under CITES) are China, France, 
Germany, Japan, Russia, and the USA
MOVING FORWARD
SUMMARY OF ACTIONS FOR
GLOBAL CAVIAR MARKET
BACKGROUND TO THE
ROBUST RESEARCH
Robust and reliable research on wildlife crimes 
should be conducted to understand how related 
social networks are constituted.
COMPLEMENTARY RESEARCH
Lessons from other crime areas and corruption 
research should be drawn upon with a focus on 
best practices.
COLLABORATION
Build relationships and further collaborate with 
anti-corruption experts to raise the profile of 
wildlife crime and corruption in international fora. 
DISSEMINATION OF FINDINGS
Research findings on corruption in wildlife crime 
should also be published in development or 
governance-related journals.
MIXED METHODOLOGIES
There is a need for more robust research on 
corruption and wildlife crime using mixed 
methodologies and social science.
domestic markets
in China, the USA, Russia, and Japan lack 
implementation of a domestic caviar labelling 
system
CITES DATA SHOW
95%
of all legal caviar trade between 2000 and 2015 
was from aquaculture sources
Harris, L. and Shiraishi. H. (2018). 
Understanding the global caviar market. Results 
of a rapid assessment of trade in sturgeon 
caviar. TRAFFIC and WWF joint report. 
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* CITES is the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
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Corruption is a severe threat to wildlife conservation globally. While 
conservation practitioner anecdotes and existing empirical research all 
point to corruption as a main facilitator enabling wildlife crime, there is 
still limited knowledge about what can change this situation and help 
reverse the pernicious impact of corruption on conservation outcomes 
in practice. Corruption has a negative impact on conservation by 
reducing the effectiveness of conservation programmes, reducing law 
enforcement and political support, as well as establishing incentives 
for the overexploitation of resources. It undermines the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of laws and regulations and can be an indicator of the 
presence of organised crime groups. Corruption needs to be addressed 
as a central part of the approach to tackling wildlife crime. 
As part of a wider project by TRAFFIC in collaboration with WWF to 
understand global caviar markets and to identify hotspots for illegal 
trade (Harris and Shiraishi, 2018), funding was provided by WWF to 
incorporate an anti-corruption component, working in partnership with 
and under the guidance of the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. The 
objectives of this component were to deepen understanding of how 
corruption may be facilitating the flow of illegal caviar along the value 
chain, to identify possible intervention strategies, and to inform further 
studies concerning environmental / wildlife crime and corruption. 
A typology of corruption for the illegal caviar trade was developed 
through the review of information gathered by TRAFFIC from academic 
literature and media reports, interviews with stakeholders who had some 
knowledge of illegal caviar trade, and the rapid market assessments in 
Beijing, Berlin, Chicago, Moscow, Paris and Tokyo that were conducted 
as part of the global caviar markets study (Harris and Shiraishi, 2018). 
Furthermore, a discussion group with anti-corruption, wildlife trade 
and sturgeon conservation experts (Table 1) was organised in April 
2018 to discuss initial findings from TRAFFIC’s rapid assessments, to 
refine the typology (Figure 3), to develop recommendations for policy 
and practice, and to build working relationships to support possible 
future studies (see Annex 1 for discussion group agenda).
This report summarises key themes of corruption and wildlife crime 
as drawn from the literature reviews and interviews, and salient points 
arising from the discussion group in April 2018.
This report is the output of a 
collaborative effort involving 
wildlife trade and conservation 
experts (TRAFFIC and WWF), anti-
corruption experts / academics 
(U4 Anti-Corruption Resource 
Centre; Northumbria and Utrecht 
Universities).
SECTION 1
CAVIAR TRADE AND 
CORRUPTION
Outlines corruption risk along 
the caviar value chain and the 
relationships involved; identifies 
entry points for anti-corruption and 
anti-caviar crime interventions. 
These points draw on the knowledge 
and expertise from a discussion 
group, contextualised with findings 
from literature reviews and rapid 
assessments of key caviar markets 
(see Harris and Shiraishi, 2018).
SECTION 2
CORRUPTION AND
WILDLIFE CRIME
Summarises key topics and salient 
points of discussion on themes of 
corruption within wildlife crime and 
other sectors.
SECTION 3
MOVING FORWARD
Formulates a set of recommendations 
for further understanding wildlife 
crime-related corruption, including in 
the caviar trade. 
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ORGANISATION / AFFILIATION PARTICIPANT NAME AND ROLE
TRAFFIC
Stephanie Pendry, Wildlife Trade Information Co-ordinator 
Lindsey Harris, Programme Officer Europe
Louisa Musing, Research Officer Europe
U4 Anti-Corruption 
Resource Centre 
(U4 ACRC)
Arne Strand, Director
Aled Williams, Senior Program Advisor
Saul Mullard, Senior Program Advisor
Jessica Schultz, Senior Program Advisor
University of Northumbria Tanya Wyatt, Associate Professor in Criminology
University of Utrecht Daan van Uhm, Assistant Professor in Criminology
WWF
Rob Parry-Jones, Lead, Wildlife Crime Initiative, WWF International
Jutta Jahrl, Life for Danube Sturgeons, WWF Austria
Natalia Gozak, Senior Project Officer, Danube-Carpathian Program in 
Ukraine, WWF International
TABLE 1
List of participants, their roles and affiliations of those who attended the 
discussion group on corruption, caviar trade and wildlife crime in April 2018.
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1.1  C O N T E X T A N D BAC KG RO U N D
While the above is the most common definition, others do exist and always include three common 
elements: abuse (misuse, violation) of entrusted power (duty, office etc.) and private benefit.
In everyday language, the term is also used more broadly to represent a wide variety of objectionable 
or immoral acts, and not only those associated with formal duty (U4 ACRC, 2018). There are several 
other terms that further explain key corrupt practices, including, but not limited to bribery, collusion and 
extortion (Figure 1). 
Furthermore, corruption involves more than one party and there are various definitions that describe 
the different types of symbiotic and antithetical relationships involved (Figure 2). 
CORRUPTION
Corruption is defined as the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain 
(Transparency International, 2018)
"
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The offer or exchange of money, services or other valuables, to influence 
the judgement of a person in a position of entrusted power or persuade 
them to do something in return, often in contravention of laws, rules and 
regulations.
A secret or illegal co-operation or conspiracy to deceive others.
A conflict between an entrusted duty on the one hand, and the private 
interest of the duty-bearer on the other hand. For example, when an 
individual with a formal responsibility to serve the public participates in 
an activity that jeopardises his or her professional judgement, objectivity 
and independence.
The unlawful demand or receipt of property or money using threat or 
force.
Grand corruption, also known as political corruption, is perpetrated at 
the highest levels of government and usually involves both substantial 
benefits for the officials involved and significant losses for the state and 
its citizens and can involve ministers taking multi-million dollar bribes 
to award lucrative government concessions, as well as illicit exchanges 
in the realm of policy formation. Large sums of money may be involved, 
but other benefits like high-level appointments and policy influence can 
be the currency of grand corruption.
Payments for goods or services contrary to or forbidden by law.
Also known as "administrative" or "bureaucratic" corruption, the term 
refers to the everyday corruption that that sometimes takes place when 
bureaucrats interact with the public. While the sums of money involved 
tend to be small, they are far from "petty" for the people concerned. 
Examples include paying bribes to get formal identification documents; 
enrollment of children in school; installation of a phone line, and so forth.
BRIBERY
COLLUSION
CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST
EXTORTION
GRAND 
CORRUPTION
ILLEGAL 
PAYMENTS
PETTY 
CORRUPTION
FIGURE 1
Definitions of corrupt practices from the U4 Glossary. 
Source: https://www.u4.no/terms
DEFINITIONS
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involves a more sustained and direct association between legal and 
illegal parties. 
involves a common understanding as well as mutual benefits.
occurs when a division of labour is agreed upon between legal and illegal 
actors, where one of the parties provides uniquely distinct services to 
the other.
The unlawful demand or receipt of property or money using threat or 
force.
is premised on unequal power relations resulting in a more coercive 
partnership for one of the parties.
is when a legitimate organisation may knowingly or unknowingly provide 
funding to criminals.
COLLABORATION 
RECIPROCAL
OUTSOURCING
EXTORTION
CO-OPTATION 
FUNDING
SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIPS
is when illegal actors sell illegally obtained products in the context of 
competition with legal actors.
includes actors that undermine, attack or harm each other.
ANTAGONISTIC
INJURIOUS
ANTITHETICAL RELATIONSHIPS
FIGURE 2
Passas’ framework of symbiotic and antithetical relationships can be used to investigate the manifestation of 
corruption within the illegal wildlife market (Passas, 2002; van Uhm and Moreto, 2017)
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High demand for wild-sourced caviar and restricted legal supplies provide 
opportunity for illegal entrepreneurs to reap enormous profits.
Several potential types of illegal trade of caviar and sturgeon products include:
CAVIAR TRADE
Organised crime groups are notoriously involved in the trafficking of caviar
POACHING
Poaching of wild specimens for 
illegal sale of meat and caviar at open 
markets or through individual contacts.
CITES LABEL 
Caviar sold without mandatory 
CITES labelling, or with labelling 
requirements not fully met. 
MIS-LABELLING
Wild-sourced caviar from threatened 
sturgeon species deliberately mislabelled 
as aquaculture-derived specimens to allow 
laundering through legal trade avenues.
"BLACK-WASHING"
Aquaculture-derived products 
deliberately declared as wild-sourced or 
as a different species to sell at a higher 
price (known as "black-washing"). 
PERMIT FRAUD
Falsified or forged CITES documents, 
or genuine CITES documents issued 
corruptly, to permit (re-)export.  
LAUNDERING
Mixing of illegal and legal products 
in one shipment.
EXCEEDING PERMIT 
Amounts in shipment exceeding 
amount given on permit.
+< <
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A review of available literature identified six areas of corruption believed to be associated with illegal 
trade of caviar and sturgeon products. The text below outlines each of these corrupt practices in more 
detail and provides examples from the literature, interviews and rapid market assessments.
LINKAGES BETWEEN
CORRUPTION AND CAVIAR TRADE
In the illegal caviar trade this form of corruption is petty but could potentially be linked to grand 
corruption if large payments take place to buy political cover (includes funding relationships).
There was evidence in the literature that illegal caviar trade was conducted by organised crime 
groups who bribed officials (which demonstrates examples of co-optive and potentially collaborative 
relationships) and used violence (Sellar, 2014; van Uhm and Siegel, 2016). Many officials attempting to 
halt caviar smuggling have been killed—in the 1990s, two dozen members of a Russian anti-poaching 
unit were murdered, and in 1996, fifty-four Russian border guards assigned to disrupt the illegal caviar 
trade were killed in a bombing (Liddick, 2014). 
Poachers are often protected by the police. For instance, in 1996, a fishing boat protected by private 
militia was intercepted by coast guards in Dagestan during transfer of poached sturgeon to trucks. 
While the coastguard tried to stop this activity, corrupt water police armed with sub-machine guns 
opened fire on the coast guards, and the trucks disappeared (van Uhm and Siegel, 2016).  This is an 
example of a collaborative relationship where there is a direct association between legal and illegal 
parties. 
Poaching of wild-sourced sturgeon was also reported to be attractive to local fishers due to socio-
political changes after the collapse of the Soviet Union and high unemployment in fishing regions 
surrounding the Caspian Sea (an example of a reciprocal relationship where there is a common 
understanding by local fisherman and villagers as to the financial benefit of being involved in the caviar 
trade) (van Uhm and Siegel, 2016). For example, one illegally caught specimen can earn RUB170,000 
in profit (USD5,000) which is an extremely high level of earnings in some rural regions (Nelleman et al., 
2014). 
Illegal payments and extortion related to poaching
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Within illegal caviar trade, this form of corruption is petty but could potentially be linked to grand 
corruption if large payments take place to buy political cover. 
It was reported that in the Russian Fedreation poachers painted fishing boats with a specific mark to 
show police officials they had paid their bribes and could thus avoid inspection (van Uhm and Siegel, 
2016). Poachers were reported to work in groups together with the police and inspectors (examples of 
collaborative and reciprocal relationships) bribing them to avoid prosecution for poaching (van Uhm 
and Siegel, 2016).
Bribery and collusion to avoid prosecution for illegal caviar harvesting
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Collusion in this practice demonstrates a collaborative or reciprocal relationship. In the illegal caviar 
trade this form of corruption is petty.
During the Soviet era, the caviar trade in source countries such as the Russian Federation and 
Azerbaijan was state-controlled which provided high potential for conflicts of interest and collusion. 
In the Russian Federation, the state company regulated all sturgeon fishing by licensing or employing 
sturgeon fishermen, controlling all caviar processing facilities and acting as the country´s CITES 
Management Authority, thus issuing permits for exports. It also employed enforcement officials who 
were authorised to enforce the country´s fisheries legislation (Sellar, 2014). Today in the Russian 
Federation, aquaculture operations receive money from the government for efforts to restock rivers with 
sturgeon for conservation of the species. However, it is believed that collusion occurs as aquaculture 
operations work and share funding with illegal poachers informing them when the restocking takes 
place and when not to poach to be able to prove restocking has occurred.  
Furthermore, in Azerbaijan, all aquaculture operations were state-run but are now privately owned and 
there are no standards for them to adhere to (FAO, 2013). At the discussion group, suspicions were 
raised about particular government funded aquaculture operations where guards were heavily armed 
for protection against potential criminal activity. The presence of these armed guards indicates the 
need to protect the resource against corruption and organised crime.    
Conflicts of interest and collusion between state-owned fishing 
companies and enforcement officials 
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Criminal groups in the caviar trade are found to be regularly embedded in legal enterprises (upper 
world) that are used to hide their illegal activities (an example of outsourcing relationships).
It was found that legally registered companies involved in the aquaculture production of caviar use 
various methods to launder illegal wild-sourced caviar in the context of competition (an example of 
an antagonistic relationship). There was evidence of the use of legal documents as cover for illegal 
activities, for example: scientific fishing permits used as a cover to legalise catch of wild sturgeon in 
the Caspian Sea for commercial use; and, aquaculture facilities sourcing wild specimens for immediate 
caviar production when their own stocks were low (van Uhm and Siegel, 2016). 
It was also found that some legally registered companies were laundering aquaculture-derived caviar 
as "wild-sourced" to supply demand for wild caviar and to earn higher profits. This "black-washing" of 
legal caviar is a unique corrupt practice for wildlife crimes, and possibly unique to the caviar industry. 
The more common ways of "laundering" involved the use of false or forged documents or providing 
incorrect information on container labels regarding the species or origin of caviar, and imitating well-
known brands such as Russkaya Ikra. Other examples of mislabelling included: labels claiming the 
producer was Russia's Federal Agency for Fishery – a non-existant ministry (Sellar 2014); mislabelled 
caviar on sale in Dubai under the Caviar House brand name; and, the American firm Caviar & Caviar 
Bribery and collusion to launder caviar for sale in legal and illegal 
markets including the use of falsified documents and mislabelling
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Interviews conducted by D. van Uhm in 2014 revealed that 
coast guards, police and customs officials at airports in 
the Russian Federation all have a stake in the caviar trade, 
demonstrating reciprocal or collaborative relationships 
between criminals and enforcement officials. 
One police officer interviewed was quoted as saying “I am 
famous for being a fascist, because I don’t take bribes” 
(van Uhm and Siegel, 2016). Another source cited traders at 
markets in Moscow reporting that every morning between 
six and seven o'clock a truck with a convoy of four cars 
arrived at the back of the market with smuggled wild-
sourced caviar. One of the smuggling methods is that there 
were four cars. The front car was the scout and would alert 
the other three cars to take an alternative route to Moscow 
if the police were not bribed or able to be bribed (van Uhm 
and Siegel, 2016).
Bribery and collusion to facilitate transport of illegal caviar to 
domestic markets in source countries
I am famous for 
being a fascist, 
because I don't 
take bribes
Anonymous Russian 
Police Officer
"
According to the literature, routes for export of illegal caviar from range states included from the 
Caspian Sea overland to Moscow then through Belarus before entering the European Union (EU) 
through Poland. 
Border officials were reportedly bribed at airports and borders to enable safe passage, including the 
bribery of Polish border guards to allow safe passage into the EU (van Uhm and Siegel, 2016). Another 
trade route to the EU was from Russia and Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey and into the EU. 
Furthermore, middlemen in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan explained how they deploy airline employees to 
smuggle caviar, bribing customs officials to ensure safe export out of the country (van Uhm and Siegel, 
2016).
Legal commercial fishing and trade in sturgeon species in Azerbaijan has not taken place since 2010. 
However, there was evidence that it is a country of origin for illegal (wild-sourced) caviar (van Uhm and 
Siegel, 2016) with possible involvement of Bulgaria, Iran and Armenia and smuggling routes overland 
to the EU via the Russian Federation or Turkey. Anecdotal information also noted caviar from other 
Caspian states (Azerbaijan, Russian Federation and Turkmenistan) was being repackaged as Iranian 
before export to Europe (van Uhm and Siegel, 2016). In 2001, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was under 
a CITES trade suspension. This was because USD25 million worth of caviar, which originated from 
Bribery and collusion to smuggle illegal caviar to export markets
 C o r r u p t i o n  a n d  W i l d l i f e  C r i m e 1
printing counterfeit labels to use on caviar tins held in the United Arab Emirates, and then importing 
them into the USA as “legitimate Russian produce” (Liddick, 2014). 
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the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, was destined for illegal export using falsified CITES permits1 
to USA and Europe. Notably, the facilities involved were heavily guarded by armed Russian nationals 
(Sellar, 2014).  
Individuals reportedly transport wild-sourced caviar into the EU via airplanes or refrigerated vehicles, 
risking arrest or paying bribes to officials if caught (van Uhm and Siegel, 2016); fines are reportedly 
not proportional to potential profit in the commodity chain nor to the damage done to wild populations 
(J. Geßner2, pers. comm., 2017). Anecdotal information also suggests airline employees have been 
deployed to smuggle wild-sourced caviar from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Iran, bribing customs 
officials to allow passage (an example of funding relationships) (van Uhm and Siegel, 2016). 
It was also reported that groups of people had been known to travel together with 125 g of caviar each 
(the legal limit exempt from CITES document requirements, under the personal effects exemption3) 
across borders and then caviar is combined at the destination for sale at markets (Parry-Jones4, pers. 
comm., 2018). Russian businessmen or immigrants were mentioned by several interviewees as involved 
in the sale of illegal caviar in Europe and North America (van Uhm and Siegel, 2016). 
The discussion group noted that more evidence is needed to determine if this part of the value chain is 
particularly prone to corruption risk, or whether problems arise due to other factors, such as capacity 
deficits among customs and other enforcement officials. Possibly, these officials are turning a blind 
eye to avoid additional work rather than acting corruptly. 
1.2  OT H E R K E Y P O I N T S
1 The suspension was lifted in 2003.
2 IGB Leibniz-Institute, Berlin
3 CITES Resolution Conf. 12.7 (Rev. CoP17) Conservation of and trade in sturgeons and paddlefish 
https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-12-07-R17.pdf
4 Wildlife Crime Initiative, WWF International
  Caviar trafficking does not occur in isolation, and, in some cases, has been linked to weapons 
trafficking (van Uhm, 2018). 
  Consumer preference for caviar originating from the wild rather than from aquaculture operations 
was identified as a key driver of illegality. Without such demand from retailers and consumers, or 
the perception that wild-sourced caviar is "better", there would be less need for illegal trade. Caviar 
consumers are high-end wealthy individuals, similar in some respects to consumers of ivory; thus, 
lessons may potentially be drawn from ivory demand reduction strategies.  
Figure 3 offers an overview of the basic typology of corrupt practices identified in the illegal caviar 
trade, and disaggregates these by site, location in the trade chain, typical actors involved, type of 
corruption, and the types of relationships involved.
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1.3
This typology is a first step in understanding how corruption facilitates illegal caviar trade and how to 
develop interventions to address it. The purpose is to guide further research to gather more concrete 
evidence based on the theories and relationship types identified, to inform responses to illegality in the 
caviar trade, and potentially more widely in illicit wildlife trade.
Next steps for conservation and anti-corruption experts to move forward with this are:
  Compare the dynamics of the caviar trade against trafficking in other types of wildlife to identify 
any similarities or differences;
  Gather further data on corrupt practices, for example, by requesting CITES Secretariat mission 
reports that have been conducted in the Russian Federation focusing on caviar trade;  
  Conduct further analysis to understand whether there are links between the different stages along 
the caviar value chain. Actions that could be taken include conducting a financial audit for the 
different stages of the value chain or using social network analysis to improve the understanding 
of the actors behind the different stages along the chain;
  Public financial management reform seems to be one of the most effective anti-corruption means. 
Strengthening auditing and budgeting processes have a general disciplining effect on other 
functions of government. For example, some measures that could be effective in ensuring legality 
along the caviar value chain include regular auditing of revenue and expenditures of aquaculture 
operations and fisheries operations. Regularly publishing full financial statements of government 
owned / funded aquaculture operations would also provide transparency and public scrutiny. While 
there could be a bias due to research focusing on this area, exploring whether this approach is also 
applicable in the wildlife crime context would be warranted; and 
  Develop a corruption risk assessment for wildlife crime in general and specifically for caviar crime.
N E X T S T E PS F O R F U T U R E 
R E S E A RC H I N TO C O R R U P TI O N 
A N D CAV I A R T R A D E
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2 S U M M A RY
A 2016 review of existing research into wildlife crime and corruption conducted by U4, WWF and IIED5 
(Williams, Parry-Jones and Roe, 2016) was presented.
This report identified that existing studies tend to discuss 
corruption associated with wildlife crime through a 
conservation lens, with only a few examining corruption 
and wildlife crime through an explicit anti-corruption lens. 
Most research concerning corruption in wildlife crime was 
published in conservation journals rather than development or 
governance-related journals where anti-corruption research is 
usually found. Methods used in the existing studies included 
household surveys, participant observation, qualitative 
interviews, statistical analyses and case studies. The review 
concluded that there is a lack of research using mixed 
methodologies (combining quantitative data with qualitative 
information) and that evidence of the effectiveness of anti-
corruption interventions is lacking. 
existing studies tend 
to discuss corruption 
associated with wildlife 
crime through a 
conservation lens
"
Discussion among the group focused on the following themes and ways of moving forward: 
5 International Institute for Environment and Development
Consideration of how social norms and networks affect corruption is essential when developing 
frameworks to deal with corrupt practices and to develop interventions:
  Corruption is often rooted in a country’s traditions and political development and can flourish 
when institutions are weak and where the normal motivations for the public sector to work 
productively may be undermined. Some economic research argues that in these cases, corruption 
can be efficiency enhancing for the economy if it is merely a transfer of money from one party 
to another. Bribes can also, in theory, increase economic efficiency, if they allow parties to avoid 
overly restrictive regulations (The World Bank, 1997). However, these models assessing the 
possible positive effects of corruption consider static outcomes rather than the long-term effects 
of corruption (The World Bank, 1997);
  Social network analysis has been recommended to understand how corrupt networks in wildlife 
crime operate in practice. Individuals are embedded in webs of social relations and interactions, 
and if pro-corruption social norms exist in those social networks, individuals are likely shaped 
towards corruption rather than away from it. In some contexts, corruption may be the expected 
form of behaviour and simply “the way of doing things” that serves certain social functions such as 
Approaches to tackling corruption
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organisational structure (Williams and Dupuy, 2018). Thus, rather than corruption being a form of 
"rule breaking" it may actually be seen as "rule following" that depends on the behaviour of society 
(Berninghaus et al., 2013). Understanding and considering how corruption can be tied to social and 
cultural norms, functions and relations will help those trying to tackle corruption in wildlife crime 
grasp why this phenomenon is so persistent in certain sectors, institutions and localities (Ayling, 
2012). One potential approach suggested for wildlife crime was to interview retired wildlife crime 
officers who may be more willing to provide information as they are no longer directly involved;
  Crime and the risk of corruption in certain areas is influenced by factors including, inter alia, conflict, 
political unrest and instability, economic crises, oppression, supply shortages and differences in 
values and priorities among states (Passas, 1999). These factors are examined under the umbrella 
concept of "criminogenic asymmetries" which refers to the structural discrepancies, mismatches 
and inequalities in the areas of economy, law, politics and culture (Passas, 1999). These asymmetries 
can cause crime by fuelling demand for illegal goods and services, by generating incentives for 
people and organisations to engage in illicit activities, and thus reduce the ability of authorities 
to control crimes (Passas, 1999). In the context of the caviar trade, there are several criminogenic 
factors that make illegal caviar trade attractive; the high prices paid for caviar, social instability in 
countries of origin and loopholes in regulation, to name a few. The poor fishing villages around the 
Caspian, which are sometimes only accessible by boat, are vulnerable places for criminal activities 
and sometimes these forms of crime are a normal response to the need to sustain livelihoods and 
to cultural expectations (Passas, 1999; Bovenkerk, 2001; van Uhm and Siegel, 2016); and, 
  Where the governance structure and governments themselves can be corrupt and be a barrier 
to move forward, understanding and changing the social norms could be more effective than an 
enforcement orientated approach.
No complete overview of the types, mechanisms and modalities 
of corruption in wildlife crime in all locations currently exists, 
highlighting the need for further research and more robust 
methodologies.
There are considerable challenges in obtaining robust quantifiable 
data on corruption, however, drawing on existing knowledge among 
conservation practitioners on the prevalence, scope and scale of 
corruption associated with wildlife crime is required which could 
then be systematically collated and shared. A recent Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study, which 
provides a structured analysis of how corruption facilitates 
wildlife crime based on research conducted in four source and 
transit countries in East and Southern Africa, is one such example 
useful for conservation practitioners (OECD, 2018).
A top-down and bottom-up approach needs to be adopted, particularly for corruption and wildlife crime 
as there are large differences between commodity types. For example, smuggling caviar uses different 
mechanisms to smuggling timber due to the scale of the commodity and different shipment modus 
operandi used. Although the modalities for corruption may be the same, it is critical to understand the 
local nuances of corrupt practices at the source and destination for each specific wildlife crime.
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The use of social science approaches to understand and tackle 
corruption is essential. However, asking the right questions 
and in a manner that ensures responses reflect the truth can 
be challenging. Nuno and St John (2015) provide a good 
overview of methods for asking sensitive questions. Social 
science approaches should take place in situ to be effective 
(for example, interviewing truck drivers at truck stops). A good 
example of using mixed methodologies can be found in Burgess 
et al., (2012) where the authors combine quantitative data with 
qualitative interviews.
the use of social 
science approaches to 
understand and tackle 
corruption is essential
"
Collaboration between anti-corruption experts and wildlife experts should be continued and should 
draw on expertise from individual researchers on asset recovery and corruption.
  For example, a group of organisations convened by the Durrell Institute of Conservation and Ecology 
(DICE), Transparency International – UK Chapter and WWF International, formed the network 
Countering Conservation-related Corruption (3C Network) to identify, record, prevent and combat 
corruption which deleteriously affects populations of wild animals and plants. Some partners that 
could further collaborate to tackle corruption are listed in Table 2. 
  Collaborations should focus on sharing lessons learnt across environments. Existing lessons from 
anti-corruption research should also be utilised by those working on corruption in wildlife crime 
to help raise the profile of wildlife crime within the field of anti-corruption research. For example, 
at a recent G20 anti-corruption event it was questioned why there should be focus specifically on 
corruption in wildlife crime and not corruption more broadly. Another issue is that wildlife crime 
is often seen as a victimless crime and less important than, for example, human rights abuses. 
Therefore, awareness needs to be raised regarding the links between wildlife crime and human 
rights, as well as the potentially mutually supportive agendas of human rights and anti-corruption. 
The work of John H. Knox, former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment 
Collaboration
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provides a good starting point regarding the interdependencies of a healthy environment and 
human rights, and to inform approaches.
conservation practitioners anti-corruption / governance-focused organisations
WWF Transparency International
Durrell Institute of 
Conservation and Ecology 
(DICE) – University of Kent
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
TRAFFIC World Resources Institute (WRI)
The Wildlife Conservation 
Socitey (WCS)
UK Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
United for Wildlife
UK Department for International Development (DFID)
UK School of Oriental and African Studies Anti-Corruption Evidence 
Programme (SOAS ACE)
USAID and US Department of State
The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre (TraCCC)
German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
TABLE 2
Potential organisations for collaboration.
  Tackling corruption in wildlife crime requires a multi-
disciplinary and multi-dimensional approach. As criminals 
adapt and change according to alterations in political, 
social and environmental situations, so anti-corruption 
interventions must be iteratively reviewed and adapted 
accordingly. For example, stricter border control may 
change smuggling routes, and bribes may increase to allow 
safe passage. However, increased controls and regulations 
can result in corruption networks infiltrating the formal 
trade system. As enforcement personnel are trained to 
detect certain methods of smuggling, criminals adapt their 
modus operandi e.g. customs officials may be trained to 
look for ivory tusks in X-ray images, so criminals will adapt 
and change the way they transport ivory tusks (i.e. cut it 
into smaller pieces) to make it harder for customs to detect. 
Some methods may be opportunistic rather than corrupt, 
for example, trade routes could be selected because there 
are no controls, or enforcement officials may turn a blind 
eye as they do not want to deal with the paperwork rather 
than corruption facilitating passage of goods. 
as enforcement 
personnel are 
trained to detect 
certain methods of 
smuggling, criminals 
adapt their modus 
operandi 
"
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A recent study examining confiscations of wildlife in the EU found over 30% of perpetrators involved 
were legitimate business owners (Van Uhm, 2016).
  There is significant overlap between different crimes and the types of corruption involved, for 
example, the networks and individuals trafficking wildlife commodities are also used for human, 
drugs and weapons trafficking, therefore crimes should not be viewed in isolation.
  Identifying links between legal and illegal actors should also be studied. For example, people with 
knowledge of legal systems who know how to influence regulations and utilise loopholes. 
  To help build an evidence base of how corruption works, researchers should follow money flows, 
including looking into the results of financial audits. It is also vital to carry out field visits to 
confirm how money is being spent on the ground and that what is being reported to donor agencies 
is legitimate. For example, when an external audit was conducted on private loans provided in 
Mozambique it was found that the loans provided for a range of physical assets (including a tuna 
fishing fleet) which, in fact, did not exist (Williams and Isaksen, 2016). 
Areas for futher research
Previous research has shown that not conducting field visits can lead to large implementation gaps 
(see Cavanagh, 2012 and Jansen, 2009).
Measuring the effectiveness of interventions
  Interventions should be refreshed and checked for 
effectiveness to adapt as the corrupt practices change. 
Understanding the potential corruption risks that 
interventions may encounter can help to determine how 
to mitigate and reduce corruption before implementation 
(see page 22 for more information on corruption risk 
assessments). For example, Indonesia's Corruption 
Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi), 
abbreviated as the KPK) implemented a highly selective 
recruitment strategy with the applicants undergoing 
thorough background checks as well as technical and 
psychological tests to reduce the risk of employing corrupt 
individuals into the agency (Bolongaita, 2010). A good 
example of interventions developed from an understanding 
of the corruption typology is found in Milledge, Gelvas and 
Ahrends’ 2007 study of corruption in Tanzania’s timber trade 
which resulted in policy and multi-stakeholder dialogues, 
leading to development of action plans in collaboration with 
timber trade companies, and ultimately also engagement of 
broader civil society (Milledge, Gelvas and Ahrends, 2007).
interventions 
should be refreshed 
and checked for 
effectiveness to 
adapt as the corrupt 
practices change
"
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1
RISK
IDENTIFICATION
What are the specific types of corruption risks that are likely 
to affect the desired outcomes of the activity? This requires 
identifying specific corruption risks in an interventions theory 
of change (see above for examples);
RISK
ASSESSMENT
This should use both a magnitude of probability and a 
measure of impact to understand how serious these risks are;2
3
RISK
MITIGATION
What can be done to reduce the potential frequency and / 
or effect of the behaviours identified? These could include 
strengthening internal processes, conducting activities to 
mitigate risky activities or mitigate risky conditions in the 
external environment or a combination of these approaches. 
P
THE THREE BASIC PHASES OF 
CORRUPTION RISK 
ASSESSMENT
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MOVING
FORWARD
SECTION 3
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KEY GENERAL SUGGESTIONS FOR  
ENGAGEMENT ON 
CORRUPTION IN 
WILDLIFE CRIME
Robust and reliable research on wildlife crimes should be conducted to 
understand how related social networks are constituted, and how social norms 
influence corruption. In that context, emphasis should be placed on the likely 
failure of attempting directly to transpose Western values to other regions. 
Therefore, efforts should be made to utilise a robust mixed-methodological 
approach that considers local / national / regional social norms, networks, 
traditions and politics.  
ROBUST RESEARCH
Data and information already available on corruption in wildlife crime should 
be collated and analysed to identify common practice modalities of corruption 
and mechanisms used for corrupt practices to understand better how corruption 
differs between wildlife commodities and inform future interventions. 
DATA ANALYSIS
Lessons from other crime areas and corruption research should be drawn upon 
with a focus on best practices and whether those lessons are transferable 
to wildlife crime. It should be explored whether corruption in wildlife crime 
differs from corruption in other crimes
COMPLEMENTARY PRACTICES
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Build relationships and further collaborate with anti-corruption experts to raise 
the profile of wildlife crime and corruption in international fora to ensure it is 
considered a priority.  When considering possible partnerships, the possible 
outreach or multiplier effect of the partners should also be considered.
COLLABORATION WITH EXPERTS
Research findings on corruption in wildlife crime should also be published 
in development or governance-related journals and not exclusively in 
conservation journals to put the emphasis on the criminality elements and 
less on wildlife.
DISSEMINATION OF FINDINGS
There is a need for more robust research on corruption and wildlife crime using 
mixed methodologies and social science, including the possibility of interviewing 
retired wildlife crime officers. In that context, training by relevant experts would 
be needed for relevant stakeholders relating to corruption methodologies, such 
as corruption risk assessments or social network analysis.
MIXED METHODOLOGIES
Involving development aid agencies as donors for anti-
corruption projects could help increase funding sources 
for anti-corruption projects in wildlife crime (and more 
generally) and provide avenues for sharing findings.
DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
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QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH INTO  
CORRUPTION AND 
WILDLIFE CRIME
How do we understand if corrupt practices in wildlife 
crimes work in isolation or are linked to the broader 
political economy? How do we assess sectorally-specific 
interventions in the context of broader reform? 1
How do we deepen understanding of financial elements 
linked to wildlife crime and corruption? 2
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Can we take a systems approach in tackling some corrupt 
practices in wildlife crime e.g. the use of fraudulent CITES 
permits or bribery of CITES officials, or do we need to tackle 
corruption on a commodity by commodity basis?3
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3rd Floor Meeting Room, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway
Corruption is a severe threat to wildlife conservation globally. While conservation practitioner 
anecdotes and existing empirical research all point to corruption as a main facilitator enabling 
wildlife crime, there is still limited knowledge about what can change this situation and help reverse 
the pernicious impact of corruption on conservation outcomes in practice.
As part of a wider project by TRAFFIC in collaboration with WWF to understand global caviar markets 
and to identify hotspots for illegal trade, an anti-corruption component has been incorporated, working 
in partnership with and under the guidance of the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre to understand 
how corruption may be facilitating and affecting illegal caviar trade along the value chain.
We invite you to attend a discussion group bringing together experts on (anti-)corruption, on wildlife 
trade and on sturgeon conservation to share initial findings and to develop the research agenda, 
methods and studies needed regarding the caviar trade, and concerning wildlife crime in general. The 
outputs of the group will be included within the wider report on global sturgeon trade being developed 
by TRAFFIC for WWF.
SUMMARY
Colleagues from TRAFFIC and WWF working on wildlife trade, anti-corruption and WWF’s global 
sturgeon strategy, as well as U4 advisors and experts from other institutions (e.g. Chr. Michelsen 
Institute (CMI), the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)) working on anti-corruption topics will be 
invited to attend. The Discussion Group will be moderated by Aled Williams, U4 Senior Advisor working 
on anti-corruption in natural resource and energy sectors.
PARTICIPANTS
Share initial findings from the TRAFFIC study on the global caviar trade including corruption evidence 
/ aspects;
Present, discuss and further refine a corruption and caviar trade typology, reflecting on the initial 
TRAFFIC study findings;
Discuss and develop possible recommendations for policy and practice, including a corruption risk 
assessment and corruption risk management approach for caviar trade and wildlife trade interventions;
Discuss and develop ideas for further investigation of corruption in the caviar trade, and more generally 
in wildlife crime.
OBJECTIVES
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SESSION
Welcome and introductions 
Session 1: 
Taking the corruption and wildlife crime research agenda forwards 
• Where are we today in terms of published research on corruption and wildlife crime?
• What are the major gaps in research on corruption and wildlife crime? 
• How could these gaps be narrowed (including reflections on necessary collaborations and types of 
research)?
Presentation: 
The nested nature of corruption within the illegal caviar trade (Daan van Uhm, Utrecht 
University)
This presentation focuses on the role of corruption in facilitating the illegal caviar trade. It attempts to 
contribute to the literature by disentangling the existence, influence and nested nature of corruption within 
the illegal caviar trade based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Russia and Europe. By utilizing 
theoretical concepts of symbiotic and antithetical relationships of corruption, this presentation examines 
the presence of corruption within illegal caviar trafficking influenced by different socio-political and cultural 
settings. The outcomes help to understand the broader picture of corruption in the context of illegal wildlife 
trafficking, and caviar trafficking in specific.
Session 2: 
Corruption and caviar: Initial findings from the global TRAFFIC study 
• What do initial findings from the TRAFFIC study tell us about the role of corruption in the global caviar 
trade? 
• What were the limitations/benefits of the available data from a corruption research perspective?
Session 3: 
Developing a typology of corruption and the caviar trade 
• How can the draft typology on corruption and the caviar trade be further developed with reference to 
other corruption and illegal wildlife trade research?
• Can we develop any possible recommendations for mitigation or prevention?
• How can we evaluate success? 
Session 4: 
Corruption risk assessment and risk management approaches for wildlife conservation 
interventions 
• What does corruption risk assessment and corruption risk management mean?
• What would a corruption risk assessment and corruption risk management approach look like 
to appropriately capture the nuances of corruption forms affecting wildlife crime and/or wildlife 
conservation interventions? 
• How should information from corruption risk assessments and corruption risk management approaches 
be used to inform anti-wildlife crime/wildlife conservation interventions?
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TRAFFIC, the wildlife trade monitoring 
network, is a leading non-governmental 
organisation working globally on trade 
in wild animals and plants in the context 
of both biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable development.  
For further information contact:
TRAFFIC
Global Office
David Attenborough Building
Pembroke Street
Cambridge CB2 3QZ
UK
Telephone: +44 (0)1223 277427
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